The Tragedy of the Commons

Last week at LIB, after tcz won the first round of "Fightin' Ed"'s Where in the World is Brad Vogel Today? challenge, I totally pwned any possible future rounds. For my prize, I asked "Fightin' Ed," if that is his real name, to write a post about the Tragedy of the Commons and how it relates to environmental regulation/global warming controls or evolutionary biology/development of altruism. Even though he shamelessly hides behind a pseudonym, Ed did make good on his word and wrote the requested article.

Ed's post was fine, but as expected it did not come close to covering all the points I wanted to see, so I since I want to see it done right, I'm going to write it myself. This will likely be a substantially lengthy essay, as I feel this is a very important idea to understand, because I see it as proof that ironically, self interest alone is not always best for self interest, and government regulation is required to maximize the long term common good.


The Tragedy of the Commons involves a conflict over resources between individual interests and the common good. It occurs when there is "a tendency towards free access and unrestricted demand for a finite resource." The theory behind it has been discussed at least since Aristotle. The name comes from a 1968 essay by Grant Hardin which described a hypothetical example of a common pasture shared by local herders. Each herder can choose how large a herd to let graze in the commons. For every animal added, the herder receives additional proceeds, but the pasture is slightly degraded.

"Crucially, the division of these components is unequal: the individual herder gains all of the advantage, but the disadvantage is shared between all herders using the pasture. Consequently, for an individual herder weighing up these utilities, the rational course of action is to add an extra animal. And another, and another. However, since all herders reach the same conclusion, overgrazing and degradation of the pasture is its long-term fate. Nonetheless, the rational response for an individual remains the same at every stage, since the gain is always greater to each herder than the individual share of the distributed cost is. The overgrazing cost here is an example of an externality." /wikiplagiarism

There are really only three ways to reach on optimal solution.
1. Divide the land up for private use, eliminating the issue of the shared costs.
2. Force an equal distribution of all yields, eliminating the issue of the individual gains.
3. Enact a governing authority to enforce regulations limiting usage, eliminating the issue of the herders making rational decisions.

The idea of the commons can be applied to any commonly shared resource. One example is the issue of global warming. Everyone shares the atmosphere. People benefit by burning fuels which produce CO2. The costs of global warming will be shared by all. It is still in each individual's best interest not to worry about it. This topic does have the added problem that there is no way to divide up the atmosphere, so Option 1 is not applicable. Option 2 would require a global socialist government. Option 3, establishing limits on CO2 emissions, seems to be the most practical.

The study of game theory, particularly examples such as the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt, are of much interest to those studying evolution. As a general rule of evolution, those whose actions benefit themselves the greatest should dominate. It seems that altruism could not have evolved because the tragedy of the commons would always favor selfish individuals; whose genes for selfish behavior would therefore come to predominate. However, altruism has developed, along with an understanding of fairness, both in humans and to a degree in other animals. The tragedy of the commons shows that adopting common, fair rules regulating social behavior generates a better outcome for all than simply acting according to self interest. This suggests to me that government regulation is a product of evolution.

You can bring up Hobbes' Leviathon, Locke's social contract, or any of the other philosophical theories about the origins of government. But, I think it is possible, that we have a behavioral instinct to form rules and laws to limit our individual self interest.

I do realize that this is just a hypothetical and that there is no clear right answer, as Ed states. If it were otherwise, there would be little point in discussing it.

I would like to add that one of the most appropriate topics to apply the Tragedy of the Commons, and the one Grant Hardin focused on, is population control. It is in everyone's best interest to have many children. Explosive population growth makes Malthous angry.


Added:
*tcz deserves recognition for giving the first correct answer to the Where is Brad Vogel challenge.

*"Fightin' Ed" questions the application of evolutionary biology to altruism. I had decided not to get into altruism too deeply as altruism reflects a free choice to act against self interest and rules and regulations force one to act against self interest. This is the difference between donations and taxes. But, for anyone interested, I'll direct you to the Wikiarticle on Reciprocal Altruism, which should be noted is the best strategy at the Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Also, moderately related, two studies on altruism in chimps.

As for the TotC being a zero-sum game, I was not aware that it had to be. I do know the classic Prisoner's Dilemma is a non-zero-sum game. I would have to do a bit more research, however, to determine if zero-sumness matters or can be applied to things like inclusionary zoning.

*I do realize that the crux of my argument relies on the government regulations being fair. And I know the adages about power corrupting and too many cooks. My ideal government is run by algorithm, or by me. For a somewhat related article on why some governments irrationally remain corrupt, Reason Mag explains Why Poor Countries are Poor.

*And of course, the one thing no one has mentioned yet. Option 2, the division of profits, is a horrible solution in game theory because then it is in the best interest of each farmer to do no work at all because they will still receive the same profit as those who do work.